Strategic investment in the supply chain for russian gas : a Shapley value analysis by Logacheva, Marina
  
Strategic Investment in the 
Supply Chain for Russian Gas 
A Shapley Value Analysis 
Marina Logacheva 
Supervisor: Lars Mathiesen 
Master Thesis in Financial Economics 
NORGES HANDELSHØYSKOLE 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis was written as a part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business 
Administration program - Major in International Business. Neither the institution, nor the 
advisor is responsible for the theories and methods used, or the results and conclusions 
drawn, through the approval of this thesis. 
NORGES HANDELSHØYSKOLE 
Bergen, 14.12.2010 
 2
Abstract 
In this thesis I use cooperative game theory – the Shapley value – to analyze the power 
structure in the supply chain for Russian gas and, furthermore, to evaluate the strategic 
impact of different investment options for creating new capacities. My results show that the 
possibilities to increase capacities along the existing tracks in Ukraine and Belarus, in order 
to bypass one of the transit countries, do not change the balance of power dramatically, 
whereas a direct, though very costly, link through the Baltic Sea, the Nord Stream pipeline, 
significantly strengthens Russia’s strategic position. I also look into various factors on 
demand and supply side and investigate whether the construction of the Nord Stream 
pipeline may be superfluous. 
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1. Introduction 
The European dependence on Russian natural gas has been and continues to be a critical 
issue. For some decades, gas imports have been an important feature of Europe’s gas supply, 
with the Russian Federation providing a quarter of EU consumption and more than 40% of 
its imports, which makes Russia the EU’s single most important supplier of natural gas. The 
share of Russian hydrocarbons on the EU market is projected to remain high in the future, as 
the development within the EU over the past 20 years shows a clear trend towards increasing 
import dependency. Whereas both demand and production grew until the mid-1990s, 
production has since stabilised, and from 2004 it has been declining, while consumption 
level has kept rising. Considering not only the increased energy demand in Europe, but also 
the large Russian reserves of hydrocarbons, the geographical proximity of Russia and the 
EU, environmental concerns regarding other fuels (mainly coal) and the phasing-out of 
nuclear power in the EU, Russia is expected to be the swing supplier of natural gas to Europe 
for the foreseeable future. 
Gazprom, Russia’s dominant gas company, plans to boost export levels of gas to Europe in 
the years to come, increasing the supply from its current level of almost 100 bcm/a by 
another 50 bcm/a over the next decade. Such a growth of supply, however, requires heavy 
investment in transportation infrastructure linking customers in Western Europe to the main 
pipelines in Western Russia.   
A high market share of Russian gas should not be any threat to Europe as long as deliveries 
are stable and predictable. To begin with, Russia’s gas exports to Europe arrived via 
pipelines through Ukraine and Czech and Slovak Republics, and later on - Belarus and 
Poland. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia emerged as a central player 
owning most of the gas fields and essential pipelines. However, it also became dependent on 
newly independent transit countries as they have inherited the pipelines crossing their soil. 
While some countries, such as Slovakia and Czech Republic, managed to find a stable long-
term solution for their gas relations with Russia, others, such as Ukraine and Belarus, 
engaged in continuous bargaining over prices and transit fees, leveraging their strategic 
positions in the export chain. Disagreements on the terms of sale and transit of Russian gas 
through the transit countries have resulted in several gas supply interruptions, affecting EU 
Member States to varying degrees. The supply interruptions have caused broad concerns in 
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Europe regarding energy security and undermined Russia’s role as a reliable supplier of 
natural gas.  
In this thesis I look at three options for Russia to increase its transmission capacity in order 
to meet the additional import needs of Europe. The cheapest option is to upgrade the old 
system in Ukraine which was built in Soviet times. As the second cheapest option for 
creating new capacities comes a new pipeline passing through Belarus, which would be built 
along the already existing pipeline, known as Yamal 1. However, the turmoil surrounding 
Russia’s relations with the transit countries led Gazprom to start looking for a direct link to 
its customers in Western Europe. As a diversification alternative for Gazprom’s export 
routes, Russia is planning to build a direct offshore pipeline between Germany and Russia, 
known as Nord Stream. Nord Stream is by far the most expensive option for creating new 
capacities. However, it would have the advantage, for the Russian supplier, of not crossing 
any of the traditional transit countries such as Ukraine and Belarus.  
In order to disentangle the commercial reasons to increase the transmission capacity from the 
strategic aspects of investment and, further, to analyze the power structure in the supply 
chain for Russian gas, I use cooperative game theory - the Shapley value. I model the 
interdependencies in the gas network as a game in value function form. The solution of the 
game allocates to each country a share in the total profit. The relative size of payoff indicates 
the strength of the player’s position and can be interpreted as his bargaining power, or power 
index. By applying the Shapley value, I derive the bargaining power of the different players 
along this supply chain endogenously from the architecture of the pipeline network and the 
various options to modify it. Here lies the advantage of the Shapley value approach, as it 
does not require any specific assumptions about details of the bargaining process, sequences 
of moves etc.  
The disruptions of Russian gas supplies to Western Europe, caused by recurrent conflicts 
between Russia and its transit countries, shed light on the powerful position of the transit 
countries in the supply chain. From a short-term perspective, the power of a player appears 
to be determined by his control of existing transport capacities. The status quo, however, can 
be changed by adding new pipelines to the existing system. Consequently, the analysis of the 
power structure in the network depends on what is considered to be the relevant scope of the 
game. I consider two borderline cases of extreme ‘shortsightedness’ and ‘farsightedness’ 
which define the scope of the game. The short-sighted scenario is represented by the “status 
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quo” game, for which the game’s value function is derived by allowing for the use of 
existing capacities only. The “all options” game represents the far-sighted scenario. Here the 
value of a coalition is derived by allowing for optimal investment in all pipelines, which do 
not cross the territory of outside players.  
Solving the model numerically, I find that the scope of the game is of outmost importance 
for the assessment of the power structure. In the short-sighted “status quo” game, Belarus 
and Ukraine appear to be much stronger than in the far-sighted “all options” game, in which 
Russia’s bargaining position is strengthened significantly. Looking at the impact of each 
single pipeline option on the power index, I find that the possibilities to increase capacities 
along the existing tracks in Ukraine or Belarus do not change the balance of power 
dramatically. By far the strongest impact on the bargaining power is exerted by Nord Stream. 
Although this project cannot compete commercially with the other options to increase 
transport capacity, it strengthens Russia’s bargaining position more than all other options 
together. In other words, in the supply chain for Russian gas, competition between Belarus 
and Ukraine is of little strategic importance compared to Russia’s direct access to its 
customers in Western Europe. 
The thesis also investigates a viewpoint that it does not necessarily need to be the turmoil 
between Russia and its transit countries that is the largest threat to both large and stable 
Russian gas supplies to Europe. There are several other challenges and uncertainties within 
the Russian natural gas industry that have to be dealt with when the predictions of future 
Russian gas exports are made. Russia currently struggles with undefined depletion rates for 
several giant operating gas fields due to uncertain and unique physical characteristics. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of financial ability to compensate for the observed production 
decline and to upgrade the aging transportation network. Finally, there are major 
uncertainties associated with the speed and effect of the domestic Russian gas market 
reforms. There have recently been studies revealing that if Russian gas prices approach the 
international market levels, Europe may no longer be the preferred selling market for 
Russian gas producers, see e.g. Sagen & Tsygankova (2007)  
On the demand side, the future development of the European gas demand relies heavily on 
growing awareness of environmental concerns and related regulations in the European 
Union. These and other factors, that have potential to affect the supply of Russian natural gas 
and the future gas demand in Europe, are discussed in the thesis. 
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This thesis is to a large degree inspired by “Investment Options and Bargaining Power in the 
Eurasian Supply Chain for Natural Gas” – a study by Franz Hubert and Svetlana Ikonnikova 
(2009).They model the pipeline construction in the Eurasian gas market as a bargaining 
process between one producer, Russia, and several potential transit countries: Ukraine, 
Belarus, Poland, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania. In order to derive the power structure in the 
supply chain, Hubert & Ikonnikova (2009) apply three cooperative game concepts: the 
Shapley value, the core and the nucleolus.  
In contrast to Hubert & Ikonnikova (2009), I confine myself to the Shapley value and look 
more deeply into this solution concept for multilateral bargaining. As to the players involved 
in the game, I consider Russia, which is the single producer of natural gas, and two transit 
countries: Ukraine and Belarus. I restrict myself to these two transit countries because of 
their difficult gas relations with Russia which have by several occasions resulted in supply 
interruptions of Russian gas to Western Europe. The main aim of my thesis is to analyze the 
balance of power in the gas network and how it could be altered through various investment 
options for creating new capacities.  
The issue of Russian gas transit to Europe has been covered to some extent in the modern 
literature. To name a few examples, Varro (2006) analyzes the thorny gas relations between 
Russia and Ukraine as an unstable “Chicken game” resulting from the bilateral monopoly 
situation between the two countries. Hirschhausen et al. (2005) study the options of 
transporting Russian gas to Western Europe, with a focus on the relations between Russia 
and Ukraine, where they model non-cooperative and cooperative strategies for two- and 
three player games.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. The next section provides the historical 
background and describes the main features of the Eurasian supply system for natural gas. In 
section 3 I introduce the Shapley value concept and calibrate the model. Section 4 provides a 
simple example demonstrating how the Shapley value is calculated. I present and interpret 
the numerical results in section 5. Section 6 investigates future development of gas demand 
in Europe as well as it looks into potential challenges within the Russian natural gas 
industry. Section 7 concludes.  
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2. The Supply Chain for Russian Gas 
2.1 Historical Background 
Russian transmission system for natural gas, originally shaped during the 70s and 80s, is 
formed as a network of pipelines stretching from gas fields in Siberia and Central Asia to 
Western Russia and further on to the industrial centres in Western Europe. The backbone of 
the network, Brotherhood-Transgas (labelled “Transgas” in Figure 1), was already built in 
Soviet times. This transcontinental pipeline, passing through Ukraine, Slovakia and Czech 
Republic, is the main corridor for Russia’s gas exports, as approximately 80% of exports are 
taking this route prior to arriving in the EU.  
FIGURE 1: Existing and Planned Natural Gas Pipelines to Europe 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration  
In Soviet times, when Ukraine was a part of the USSR and former Czechoslovakia belonged 
to the CMEA block, there were no transit problems. Russia’s relations with the former 
Soviet Union countries were characterized by a high degree of economic and political 
interdependence, and this was particularly evident in the energy industry. The transit 
countries enjoyed only limited freedom to pursue their own agenda and the Soviet Union, 
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concerned with being regarded as a reliable gas supplier, strictly complied with all its 
obligations. When the USSR disintegrated, Russia was faced with the question of how to 
relate to the fourteen newly emerged sovereign states. This issue set off a wider debate in 
Russia on whether the country should pursue integration with Europe, or whether its 
geographical position afforded it a special role between East and West. 
Russia inherited most of the Soviet’s gas fields and essential transport pipelines and, 
consequently, controls critical bottleneck facilities and dominates supplies to energy-
importing countries. At present, even Central Asian exporter countries depend on transport 
through Russian pipelines to reach customers.  
However, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia also became dependent on 
three newly independent transit countries, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Ukraine, for the 
final delivery of natural gas to the markets in Western Europe. These countries have 
inherited the pipeline infrastructure developed on their territory and became Russia’s only 
supply route to Western Europe. In a way, these gas pipelines crossing the region symbolize 
the intense economic interdependence of the former Soviet states.  
By 1993, the Russian government adopted a foreign policy orientation where it sought to 
pursue a “Russia first” policy in its relations with the West at the same time as it aimed to re-
exert Russia’s sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union, acknowledging the 
importance of relations with the other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. 
The CIS has been as much a means of the separation of member countries from the 
hegemony of Russia as for their integration. While some countries aimed for closer relations 
with Russia, others sought to maintain their newfound sovereignty.  
Slovakia and Czech Republic privatized their sections of the southern system and sold them 
to western importers. Emerging from former Czechoslovakia, these countries benefited from 
old contracts with the Soviet Union, which entitled them to large deliveries of gas at low 
cost. Both countries developed stable commercial gas relations with Russia and transit never 
became an issue. Ukraine and Russia, in contrast, failed to find a stable long-term solution 
for their gas relationship. 
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2.2 Southern System 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, oil import prices to Ukraine soon reached world 
market levels, however gas import prices and transit fees for Russia’s exports through 
pipelines in Ukraine were set in bilateral negotiations. Russia’s dependence on gas transit 
through Ukraine to reach western markets provided Ukraine with significant bargaining 
power in the price negotiations with Gazprom. Hence, prices for Russian gas in Ukraine 
were considerably lower than prices paid in Europe, though they were still somewhat higher 
than prices inside Russia.  
Russia tried to privatize Ukrainian pipelines, but was not successful due to strong Ukrainian 
commitment to seek rents. Ukraine consolidated its pipeline system in a state owned national 
monopoly, Naftogas, which is in charge of domestic supply and international transit. 
Throughout the nineties Gazprom and Naftogas were constantly involved in recurrent 
disputes over fees for transit service, the price for Ukraine’s additional gas imports, 
delinquent debts etc. The unauthorized use of Russian gas by Ukraine has added to the 
problem.  
Given that Ukraine’s gas import and transit arrangements are closely intertwined, the 
situation on the Ukrainian domestic gas market and the country’s trade relations with Russia 
have the potential to have serious implications for consumers in Western Europe. 
Disagreements on the terms of sale and transit of Russian gas through Ukraine have led to 
gas supply interruptions in January 2006, March 2008 and January 2009. While the 
interruption in 2008 was entirely absorbed by Ukraine, the interruptions in 2006 and 2009 
affected EU Member States to varying degrees, with the interruption in 2009 becoming the 
most serious to date.  
In the early days of January 2009 a commercial dispute between Gazprom and Naftogas 
provoked a 3-week interruption of natural gas supply on the EU – Ukrainian border. The gas 
crisis began with a failure to reach an agreement on gas prices and supplies for 2009. On 1 
January 2009, Gazprom reduced the gas supply to Ukraine, while keeping transit to the 
European Union at steady level. In response, Ukraine started to take gas illegally from the 
transit pipelines. In the following days the situation deteriorated with several European 
countries reporting major falls or cut-offs of their gas supplies from Russia transported 
through Ukraine. On January 7, the transit of natural gas to Ukraine was completely shut off 
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by Russia. Meanwhile, the gas contract with Russia was still not signed because Ukraine 
declined Russia’s offer for gas import and transit prices. The conflict was resolved on 
January 19, when the head of Gazprom, Alexei Miller, and the head of Naftogaz, Oleh 
Dubyna, signed an agreement on natural gas supplies to Ukraine for the period of 2009-
2019.  
Unsurprisingly, the largest falls in gas consumption during January 2009 were recorded in 
the Member States which were the worst affected by the gas dispute. During that time, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Greece experienced reductions in natural gas imports of 54%, 86% 
and 23% respectively: roughly equivalent to the volumes of missing gas deliveries coming 
from the Russian Federation via Ukraine. Whereas earlier interruptions of gas supplies to 
Western Europe have been extremely rare and short lived, leaving no lasting impact on 
customers in the West, the crisis of 2009 caused irreparable and irreversible damage to 
customers' confidence in Russia and Ukraine. It has highlighted Russia’s vulnerability and 
shed light on the powerful position of Ukraine in the supply chain for Russian gas.  
2.3 Yamal 
Eager to diversify its export channels and weaken Ukraine’s powerful position in the export 
chain, Russia turned to Belarus and Poland. After gaining independence Belarus remained 
closely allied with Moscow and formed a loose union state with Russia. Belarus has close 
historical and cultural ties to Russia as well as being its second largest trading partner. To 
Belarus, Russia represents an important political ally, and it has also been Belarus’ primary 
source of cheap fuel. Since 1992, Russia has supplied Belarus with subsidized gas, with 
prices for Belarus being typically lower than anywhere in the CIS region. Belarus depends 
on Russia for its annual gas demand of 18 bcm and has been chronically indebted to 
Gazprom throughout the post-Soviet period.  
When the USSR disintegrated, Russia and Belarus agreed on a long-term solution for sales 
of natural gas and transit relationships. In September 1993, Russia made its first move to 
gain control of Belarus’s gas transmission network with the signing of an agreement on the 
transfer of BelTransGaz, Belarus’s national transmission company, to Gazprom. Under the 
terms of the agreement, Belarus agreed on a 99-year lease of land for new pipelines which 
would be owned by Gazprom and operated by BelTransGaz. Belarus also agreed to ensure 
the uninhibited transit of Russian gas across its territory for export. In controlling 
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BelTransGaz, the Russian government would achieve greater security of Gazprom’s exports 
across Belarus to Europe, and at the same time remove an important lever of manipulation – 
transit capacity. For the section in Poland a joint stock company, EuroPolGaz, was 
established in which Polish PGNiG and Russian Gazprom both equally hold 48%. The 
remaining stake of 4% is held by a small company, Gas-Trading, which tips the balance in 
favour of the Polish side.  
This encouraged Gazprom to revive old, ambitious plans to develop the huge Yamal field 
and connect it to internal and external markets with a new massive northern route. 
Eventually, attention focused on the export pipeline through Belarus, which would deliver 
natural gas from Russia to Poland and Germany. The first leg of the pipeline, now 
commonly referred to as Yamal 1, went into operation in 1999. It has been conceived 
primarily as a means of avoiding transit through Ukraine, and as a more reliable route. In 
2006 three compressor stations were installed on the Belarus section of the Yamal pipeline, 
aimed at bringing it up to the target capacity of 28 bcm/a.  
Although Belarus offers the quickest and cheapest path to Europe, it is uncertain whether the 
second sting of the Yamal line will be built. The construction of the second pipeline, Yamal 
2, with a potential of another 28 bcm/a has already been started, however its completion 
seems to be very unlikely by now, partly as a result of a more tense gas relationship between 
Russia and Belarus, and Gazprom’s strategy of reducing its transit vulnerability.  
The relationship between Russia and Belarus has cooled down considerably with the advent 
of Vladimir Putin as the president of the Russian Federation in 2000. Although Putin 
advocated CIS integration, he also indicated that more stick commercial conditions would 
apply. Putin stressed the need to receive gas payments, even from those countries politically 
close to Russia.  
Gas relations between Gazprom and Belarus deteriorated for two reasons. First, Belarus was 
reluctant to pay higher gas prices. Like Ukraine, Belarus used its new strategic position in 
the export chain to gain concessions for its own gas imports. Second, Belarus was unwilling 
to move forward with the privatization of BelTransGaz, creating tensions at the political and 
commercial levels. In April 2002, Belarus and Russia signed an agreement whereby 
Gazprom would supply the republic with gas at Russia’s domestic price; furthermore it 
would cancel Belarus’ accumulated debt on condition that Gazprom would receive up to a 
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50% share in BelTransGaz. However, the second part of the agreement, which would have 
given Gazprom much more effective control over its export routes, was never fulfilled.  
Minsk and Moscow were not able to reach a compromise, and on 1 January 2004 Gazprom 
suspended gas deliveries to Belarus. Belarus responded to the cut-off by siphoning gas 
destined for Europe via the Yamal pipeline. The dispute reached its climax on 18 February 
when Gazprom imposed a total cut-off, deliberately shutting down supplies not only to 
Belarus but also to Western Europe. The total cut-off lasted less than a day and did not affect 
Gazprom’s customers in the West; nevertheless it raised serious supply concerns in Europe, 
and highlighted the fact that Gazprom has not solved the transit issue. 
2.4 Nord Stream 
The turmoil surrounding Russia’s relations with transit countries led Gazprom to start 
searching for a direct way of delivering natural gas to its customers in Western Europe. Plans 
for a direct offshore connection between Russia and Germany have been discussed since the 
late nineties; however, the implementation of the project was constantly postponed as it 
seemed to be commercially unviable. Nevertheless, in September 2005, an agreement was 
signed on the construction of a twin pipeline, later named Nord Stream, which would link 
Russia with Germany via the Baltic Sea. The aim of the pipeline is to transport Russian gas 
into Western Europe while bypassing transit countries such as Ukraine and Belarus.  
The Nord Stream offshore pipeline will be operated by Nord Stream AG, a joint company 
where Gazprom is the majority shareholder with 51% of shares. In addition to Gazprom, 
Nord Stream comprises two German companies E.ON Ruhrgas and BASF/Wintershall, each 
with 20%, and Gasunie of the Netherlands holding the remaining 9%.  
Nord Stream, also known as North Transgas and the North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP), 
is a planned 1200km long offshore pipeline from Vyborg in Russia to Greifswald in 
Germany through the Baltic Sea. When constructed, Nord Stream will be among the longest 
offshore pipelines of the world. It will have two parallel legs, each with an annual capacity 
of 27.5 bcm of natural gas, bringing an additional 55 bcm per year of supply capacity to the 
European market. The gas will originate in the already developed Yuzhno Russkoye field 
and, later on, in the Yamal Peninsula, Ob-Taz Bay and the Shtokman fields. The first gas 
delivery is scheduled for late 2011.  
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The interpretations of the Nord Stream project are very different in the various states. While 
some countries, most notably Germany and Russia, are eager proponents of the project, 
others seem to be more sceptical to the projects implementation.  
The party that would benefit the most from the construction of Nord Stream appears to be 
the European Union. As mentioned in the introduction, the development within the EU over 
the past 20 years shows a clear trend towards increasing import dependency. The EU as a 
whole faces a growing need for external energy supplies. In this context, Nord Stream can 
play an important role, as it will meet a quarter of the additional import needs of Europe.  
Nord Stream would also be an important step on the way to increased diversification of 
supply routes. As discussed previously, the European Union has experienced several gas 
supply interruptions resulting from the challenging gas relationship between Russia and its 
transit countries. This new direct energy link between the EU and Russia would make it 
possible to circumvent the transit countries and, hence, increase the security of supplies.  
The European Commission has expressed its support for the Nord Stream project and has 
given the pipeline status as a priority project under the TEN-E guidelines (Trans-European 
Energy Network). The TEN-E guidelines are meant to help increase competitiveness in the 
energy market and increase security of supply. By giving priority to certain projects, the EU 
aims to “accelerate the implementation and construction of connections and to increase the 
incentives for private investors” (EU Commission 2006: 2). However, it should be noted that 
the label “project of European interest” under the TEN-E guidelines does not imply that all 
of Europe will benefit from it.  
There are a significant number of states within the European Union that have harshly 
criticised the project since its birth, and some of them have even accused Germany of being 
guilty of putting its own interests above those of other member states. Even without taking 
into consideration the future gas needs of the EU, one cannot disregard the fact that Nord 
Stream will run ashore in Germany and the bulk of the gas would be earmarked for the 
German market. Hence, the project would serve this state more than any other within the 
union. Germany is Russia’s main partner among the old EU member states and Russia’s gas 
supplies account for some 40% of the country’s annual gas need.  
Whereas Nord Stream may be an answer to Germany’s energy dilemma, the Baltic States 
have perceived the pipeline as a problem in itself, and this is to a large extent due to their 
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history with Russia. All the three Baltic States have experienced energy cut-offs or other 
strong reactions from Russia following political or commercial disputes. Hence, the Baltic 
States have interpreted the pipeline as a politically motivated strategy that will increase 
Russia’s leverage on them and threaten their energy security. If Nord Stream is constructed, 
Russia could potentially cut supplies to East European states without it affecting the supply 
levels to Germany.  
For the Russian supplier, Nord Stream would have the advantage of not crossing any of the 
traditional transit countries - Ukraine, Slovak and Czech Republics, and more recently 
Belarus. If Nord Stream is built and fully utilised, it is possible that historical transit routes, 
Brotherhood-Transgas and Yamal, will have lower capacity utilisation rates, making Russia 
less dependent on the transit countries. 
2.5 Summary 
To summarise, the post-Soviet developments in the transport network for Russian natural gas 
reflect to a large extent Russia’s reactions to the strength of Ukraine’s position in the 
inherited system. Ukraine has been dominating the export chain for Russian gas since it 
became Russia’s only supply route to Western Europe after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. The completion of a new corridor through Belarus in 1999, the Yamal 1 pipeline, has 
modified the situation, but not profoundly. Both Ukraine and Belarus have engaged in 
continuous bargaining with Russia over prices and transit fees, leveraging their strategic 
positions in the export chain to gain concessions for their own gas imports. The turmoil 
surrounding the relations between Russia and the transit countries has resulted in several gas 
conflicts affecting Russia’s customers in the West and undermining their confidence in 
Russia as a reliable supplier. 
In order to secure much-needed gas supplies to an increasingly energy-thirsty European 
Union and, at the same time, reduce the transit countries’ position as a potential counter-
lever, Russia has considered various projects such as Yamal 2 and Nord Stream. While the 
costs of establishing alternative supply routes are well known, their strategic value is more 
difficult to estimate. In the next section I introduce a formal model of how network 
architecture and investment options determine the bargaining power of different players and 
the sharing of profits from gas exports. This framework can then be used to analyze whether 
building Yamal has helped Russia to strengthen its bargaining position and discipline 
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Ukraine, and what is the effect of the even more costly option to diversify export routes – the 
Nord Stream pipeline.  
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3. Model 
As mentioned in the introduction, I will analyze the power structure in the supply chain for 
Russian gas by applying cooperative game theory – the Shapley value. I model the 
interdependencies in the supply chain as a game in value function form, which is calibrated 
using information on the cost of different pipelines, assumptions on demand for gas and 
production costs etc. The solution of the game allocates to each country a share in the total 
profit. The relative size of payoff indicates the strength of the player’s position and can be 
interpreted as his bargaining power, or power index. Any change in demand for gas, network 
architecture, transportation cost etc. will yield a new value function. 
3.1 Theory 
Shapley value is a game theory concept proposed by Lloyd Shapley in 1953. The aim of the 
concept is to suggest a fair allocation of profits obtained by cooperation among several 
players, and further, to find the relative importance of each player regarding his contribution 
to the cooperation. When a group of players form a coalition in order to cooperate and gain 
profits, each player makes a contribution to the coalition. However, the size of the various 
contributions differs, as some players may contribute more to the coalition than the others. 
Consequently, the allocation of collectively gained profits between the players should be 
made according to the contribution of each player to the coalition. Intuitively, the power of a 
player should increase as he becomes more important to other players. The Shapley value 
concept enables to measure exactly the “importance”, or the power, of a particular player by 
looking at the contributions that the player can make to the various possible coalitions.  
The interdependencies among the players are represented by a game in value function form 
(N, v), where N denotes the set of players and v is the characteristic function, also called 
value function. The set N consists of n players which may form arbitrary coalitions K with 
nk ≤  players. The value function ( )Kv  is the minimum total payoff that coalition K can 
guarantee to its members.1 
                                               
1
 Dixit, Avinash K. and Susan Skeath (1999): Games of Strategy. Norton, pp. 572-577. 
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The Shapley Value is an allocation of payoffs ( )viφ  to each player i as defined by:2 
( ) ( ) {}( )[ ]( ) ( )
!
!!1\
n
knkiKvKvv
NK
i
−−
−= ∑
⊂
φ  
( )viφ is the sum-product of two terms: i) The marginal  contribution of player i to coalition K 
and ii) the probability of coalition K including player i. The rational behind this is that each 
player should be given a payoff equal to the average of the contributions he makes to each 
coalition to which he could belong, where all coalitions of the same size are equally likely. 
Consider that there is one original coalition K and that a player i joins it. The contribution of 
player i is evaluated by comparing the value of the coalition K including player i, ( )Kv , 
minus the value that the coalition K can obtain without him, { }( )iKv \ . The marginal 
contribution of player i is: 
( ) ( ) {})\(, iKvKvKiMC −=  
Next, consider the size of the coalition K. Size k of the coalition ranges from 1 to n. Since all 
sizes are equally likely, a particular size coalition occurs with probability 
n
1
. Then the 
( )1−k  partners of player i in a coalition of size k can be chosen from among the remaining 
( )1−n  players in any of ( ) ( )( ) ( )!!1
!1
,
knk
nknC
−−
−
=  ways.3 The reciprocal of this expression is 
the probability of any such choice of partners: ( ) ( ) ( )( )!1
!!1
,
−
−−
=
n
knkknp . Combining that 
reciprocal with 
n
1
 yields the probability of a particular coalition K of size k with player i as a 
member: 
                                               
2
 Friedman, James W. (1986): Game Theory with Applications to Economics. Oxford University Press, p.209. 
3
 Lillestøl, Jostein (1997): Sannsynlighetsregning og statistikk med anvendelser. Cappelen Akademisk, issue 4, p.44. Simple 
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Hence, the Shapley value payoff to each player is a weighted average of the contributions 
that the player makes to each of the coalitions to which he belongs with the weights 
depending on the number of players, n, and the number of members in each coalition. 
(Friedman 1986) 
However, in this thesis I want to compare different network layouts, i.e. games with different 
compositions of players. Therefore, it is more convenient to look at the relative size of 
payoff assigned to a player in a game in order to estimate the strength of the player’s 
positions, or his power index. A player’s power index is obtained by dividing the payoff 
allocated to the player by the sum of payoffs of all the players participating in the game. It 
should be noted that the payoffs ( )viφ  of all the players sum to the characteristic function v 
of the grand coalition of all players.  
The Shapley value can also be seen as a way of achieving a market-like outcome, at least 
approximately, when an actual market does not exist or cannot be arranged. A market 
mechanism would automatically reward each participant for his contribution. The Shapley 
value concept implies that a player must make an effort in order to generate his contribution. 
The fact that each player will be rewarded according to his contribution, gives the player the 
correct incentive to make that effort. 
Another appealing feature of the Shapley value is the lack of requirements about 
assumptions on details of the bargaining process, sequences of moves etc. Instead it is based 
on four axioms which define the value uniquely.  
1) Efficiency: Total gains available to the grand coalition are fully allocated between the 
players, ( ) ( )∑
∈
=
Ni
i Nvvφ . 
2) Symmetry: Players Nji ∈, are said to be symmetric with respect to game v if they 
make the same marginal contribution to any coalition, i.e. for each K ⊂  N with  
i, j K∉ , {}( ) { }( )jKviKv ∪=∪ . The symmetry axiom requires symmetric players to 
be paid equal shares, ( ) ( )vv ji φφ = . 
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3) Dummy player: If a player i adds nothing more than { }( )iv to any coalition, then the 
player receives only { }( )iv . A dummy player, that is a player whose marginal 
contribution is null with respect to every coalition, is to be assigned zero payoffs. If i 
is a dummy player, i.e., ( ) { }( ) 0\ =− iKvKv  for every NK ⊂ , then ( ) 0=viφ . 
4) Additivity: If a game is formed by adding two games together, where the game v + w 
is defined by ( )( ) ( ) ( )KwKvKwv +=+  for all NK ⊂ , then the Shapley value of the 
new game is the sum of the values of the two original games, ( ) ( ) ( )wvwv φφφ +=+ . 
 
The four conditions defined above yield a unique outcome; however, one must decide 
whether these properties are ultimately acceptable and, furthermore, equally desirable. Most 
importantly, each player would consider not the attractiveness of the properties, but the 
outcome that they would give him. If an outcome is not satisfactory for some players, or they 
believe they can do better by participating in a different game, the proposed solution of the 
game may not be accepted.  
Another aspect of the Shapley value definition, which may not have any counterpart in 
reality, is the probability of each coalition. As mentioned above, all coalitions of the same 
size are regarded as equally likely. In the case of the supply chain for Russian gas, the 
probability of coalitions between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus may depend on the former gas 
relations between the countries, present relations at the political and commercial levels, 
historical and cultural ties etc.  
Moreover, a coalition’s payoff may depend on the actions of players external to the coalition. 
Fortunately, this problem does not occur in this case because one player, Russia, is essential 
in the game. Coalitions which do not include Russia cannot establish a complete supply 
chain in order to export Russian gas, neither can they compete with the coalitions which 
include Russia.4 
As noted in the introduction, I will consider different value functions in order to reflect 
various assumptions about the scope of the game. The scope of the game is defined by two 
borderline cases of extreme ‘shortsightedness’ and ‘farsightedness’. The short-sighted 
                                               
4
 Hubert, Franz and Svetlana Ikonnikova (September 2009): Investment Options and Bargaining Power in the Eurasian 
Supply Chain for Natural Gas. Humboldt. 
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scenario is represented by the “status quo” game, where the existing capacities can not be 
changed. Hence, the power of a player is determined by his control over the installed 
pipelines. The status quo, however, can be changed by adding new pipelines to the existing 
transmission system. Therefore, a rational farsighted player should take into account all 
relevant options to extend the network in order to obtain a comprehensive evaluation of his 
bargaining power.  To assess the strategic impact of each investment option, I add that 
option to the status quo game and evaluate the changes it gives in the power structure. The 
“all options” game represents the far-sighted scenario. Here the value of a coalition is 
derived by allowing for optimal investment in all pipelines which do not cross the territory 
of the players external to the coalition. To focus on the strategic impact of the various 
investment options, I initially assume that the projects can be implemented immediately. I 
also assume a stationary environment with respect to technology, demand, etc, so that 
optimal investment is independent of the potential delay. 
3.2 Calibration 
In the following I calibrate the model to reflect the main features of the Eurasian gas network 
at the beginning of the new century. The profit that a particular coalition can achieve 
depends on demand for Russian gas and on production and transportation costs. The latter 
depends on the geographical position of the coalition’s members, past investment in 
transportation network and on the options to extend it. Details are given in the appendix. As 
the focus of this thesis is on the power structure within the Eurasian supply chain for natural 
gas, I do not take into consideration the strategic interaction between Russia and competing 
suppliers such as Norway and Algeria except for when I make assumptions on the residual 
demand for Russian gas. This will be discussed later in the thesis.   
I also restrict myself with respect to the geographic scope of the analysis as I do not take into 
consideration gas supplies to Europe which are delivered through the pipelines located in 
Southeastern Europe and Central Asia. However, there are gas pipelines from the southern 
side, both proposed and existing, that could be rivals to the Nord Stream pipeline. The South 
Stream pipeline is a proposed gas pipeline that would deliver Russian gas through the Black 
sea to Bulgaria and further to Italy and Austria. South Stream is seen as a rival to the planed 
Nabucco pipeline, which would supply gas from Iran and Azerbaijan through Turkey to 
Austria and Hungary, reducing the region’s dependence on Russian gas. Moreover, there are 
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plans for a submarine pipeline between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, known as The Trans-
Caspian Gas Pipeline. The Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, if built, would transport natural gas 
from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to Central Europe, circumventing both Russia and Iran. 
The possibility of competing supply routes may challenge the strategic position of Nord 
Stream and should therefore be taken into account when performing an economic analysis of 
the Nord Stream project. However, this is not the aim of this thesis, and therefore the 
possibility of competing pipelines through Southeastern Europe and Central Asia is outside 
the scope of my analysis. 
3.2.1 Players and Pipelines 
The main players in the supply chain are Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Using the capital 
letters for the initials of the countries, the set of players is { }BURN ,,= . The pipelines 
considered in the model are the old system through Ukraine, which I will refer to as South, 
the possibility to upgrade and extend it, referred to as Upgrade, the Yamal 1 pipeline passing 
though Belarus and its possible extension Yamal 2, and finally the direct link from Russia to 
Germany - the Nord Stream pipeline.  
Even though a large section of the southern system is located in Slovakia and Czech 
Republic, I will not consider these countries as autonomous players. As already mentioned in 
section 2.1 “Historical background”, these countries have privatized their transit pipelines 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and sold them to Western gas importers, whose 
property rights are constitutionally protected. Being the members of the European Union, 
these countries have to adhere to EU agreements and thus cannot interfere with gas transit to 
gain leverage in international negotiations.  
Poland is not considered as an autonomous player either, even though a section of Yamal 1 is 
located in the country and the Polish side has a controlling stake in EuroPolGaz. As a 
member of the European Union, Poland cannot obstruct the use of Yamal 1. Long term 
agreements and constitutional rights as well as EU regulations effectively assure Russia’s 
access to the pipeline. 
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3.2.2 Capacity Cost 
All pipeline options considered in the model establish a complete link between Russia and 
Western Europe. However, there are important differences in transportations costs. The 
estimated transportation costs for each of the pipelines can be found in the appendix. By far 
the cheapest options to serve the market are Yamal 1, with a capacity of 28 bcm/a, and the 
old transmission system through Ukraine, South, with a capacity of approximately 70 bcm/a. 
Investment cost for these pipelines is sunk. However, due to aging compressors, lack of 
maintenance and underinvestment, the capacity of South is in decline. Up to a limit of about 
15 bcm/a, the cheapest option for creating new capacities is the renovation of the southern 
system, Upgrade. For capacity increases beyond that threshold, Yamal 2 comes as the 
second cheapest option, with a capacity cost which is two times larger. Here investment 
would benefit from preparations made during construction of Yamal 1, which was 
constructed in such a way that it would be possible to add a second pipeline at a later stage. 
By far the most expensive option is Nord Stream, which requires at least another doubling of 
capital expenditure per unit of capacity. 
Table 1: Capacity Cost 
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3.2.3 Demand and Production Cost 
Finally, I have to make assumptions on demand for Russian gas in Western Europe and the 
cost of producing and transporting it to the border of Western Europe. Unfortunately, the 
calibration with respect to demand and production cost cannot be based on solid data. 
Current gas production depends on past investment in gas fields and transport facilities, 
investment cost of which is sunk. However, Russia’s giant gas fields, which have accounted 
for most of the country’s output for decades, have all reached their decline phase of 
production. Russian gas production is transforming from one based on existing production to 
one increasingly dominated by production from new, more difficult-to-develop regions 
needing new transportation infrastructure. Hence, the production cost of Russian gas 
depends on production from old fields, the cost of developing new fields and the relevant 
discount rates. The estimation of these parameters is possible, but the results would be 
highly uncertain. 
The demand for Russian natural gas is determined by preferences for natural gas, the prices 
of substitutes such as oil and gas from competitors, the cost of transporting gas within 
Western Europe etc. Most of the gas sold in Europe is based on a small number of long-term 
”take-or-pay” contracts, the details of which are not made public. The annual figures for 
average gas prices given in the statistics largely reflect oil-price movements to which 
contract prices are indexed. Consequently, there is little information on the demand side to 
allow an econometric estimation of the demand function.  
Moreover, gas imports to Western Europe do not originate from Russia alone; there are other 
major suppliers such as Norway and Algeria. Consequently, the residual demand for Russian 
gas is defined as follows: ( )ANMR QQQQ +−= , where MQ  denotes market demand, and 
NQ  and AQ  are quantities supplied by Norway and Algeria respectively.5 The price 
elasticity of residual demand facing a single supplier is higher (in absolute values) than the 
elasticity of demand for the market, because customers may switch from one gas supplier in 
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the market to another. There is in general little consensus in the literature concerning the 
price elasticities in energy markets, and estimated elasticities for Russia are almost non-
existing. The elasticities that have been estimated vary and are primarily obtained for 
member countries of the OECD. In the survey by Al-Sahlawi (1989) on price and income 
elasticities of natural gas demand, short-run price elasticities range from -0.07 to -0.63 and 
long-run price elasticities range from -0.56 to -4.6.6 
Given the lack of solid data, I choose to use demand and marginal cost of supply functions 
estimated in Hubert & Ikonnikova (2009). For simplicity they take linear specification for 
residual demand and marginal cost of supply and assume that they are independent of the 
transport route. The parameters of the functions have been chosen in order to capture the 
situation in the first years of the new century with respect to observed prices and quantities.  
The following numerical functions are obtained: 
Marginal cost of supply at Russian export node: 
( ) [ ] [ ] [ ]a/bcmxa/mcm/$8.0tcm/$11xmc0 ⋅+=  
Inverse demand: ( ) [ ] [ ] [ ]a/bcmxa/mcm/$33.0tcm/$160xp ⋅−=  
The estimated functions yield reasonable figures for prices and elasticities at observed 
quantities. Given the capacities of 98 bcm/a, the estimated function for residual demand for 
Russian gas in Western Europe yields a price of 127 $/tcm. This is consistent with the price 
of approximately 125 $/tcm paid in the European Union in 2002 as reported by British 
Petroleum (2006). 
With the price of 127 $/tcm and the quantities equal to 98 bcm/a, the price elasticity of 
natural gas demand is calculated as follows: 
( ) 93.3
98
127
33.0
1
Q
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 Sagen, Erik Lund and Marina Tsygankova (2007): Russian natural gas exports – Will Russian gas price reforms improve 
the European security of supply? Statistics Norway, Research Department. 
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The price elasticity of residual demand for Russian gas is almost -4. As mentioned 
previously, the price elasticity of residual demand facing a single supplier is much higher (in 
absolute values) than the price elasticity for the market, which becomes apparent when 
comparing the obtained price elasticity of -3.93 with the elasticities reported by Al-Sahlawi 
(1989).  
Most importantly, the parameters of the functions have been chosen so that the coalition of 
all players would maximize its profits by using existing capacities at South and Yamal 1, 70 
bcm/a and 28 bcm/a respectively, while abstaining from investments in new capacities. A 
simple calculation can help to understand the reasoning behind this. Given a declining 
demand function coupled with a rising marginal cost of production function, the profit 
function is strictly concave. The maximum profit is obtained at the quantity where marginal 
cost of production equals marginal revenue, i.e. the quantity that gives zero marginal profit. 
102x
x66160x8.011
MRMC
=
−=+
=
 
The profit maximizing quantity of the grand coalition is 102 bcm/a, which is very close to 
the existing capacities of 98 bcm/a. Hence, there would be no commercial interest to increase 
capacity. 
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4. Calculations – A Simple Example 
With the purpose of making it easier for the reader to understand how the Shapley value 
approach can be applied in order to derive the power of the different players along the supply 
chain for Russian gas, I want to start this section by giving a short but thorough presentation 
of the main steps of the calculations of the Shapley value. In order to make the presentation 
as simple and logical as possible, I use a simplified version of the model where I assume that 
the profits available to the various coalitions are proportional to the existing capacities, while 
I disregard the costs of the pipelines and the production cost. The model reflects the short-
sighted scenario of the game, where existing capacities consist of the pipelines South and 
Yamal 1. 
As explained earlier, the Shapley value, which is a player’s expected contribution to all 
possible coalitions, can be derived as follows: 
( ) ( ) {}( )[ ]( ) ( )
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where the first term in the summand is the marginal contribution of player i to coalition K 
and the second gives the probability of coalition K including player i. 
First, I calculate the marginal contribution of each player to the various coalitions of the 
game. The calculations are presented in table 2. 
Next, I calculate the probability of each coalition. The probability of a coalition consisting of 
two players, such as K({R,U}), K({R,B}) and K({U,B}), is: 
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The probability of a grand coalition consisting of all the players in the game, K({R,U,B}), is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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The probability of a player not joining any of the coalitions, i.e. the player chooses to act on 
his own, is: 
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Table 2: Marginal Contributions 
 
The final step is to calculate the Shapley value for each player participating in the game. By 
summing up the marginal contributions of the players to all possible coalitions of the game, 
while taking care of relative probabilities, I obtain the Shapley value – a share of the total 
profit allocated to each player. For example, the Shapley value for Russia is calculated as 
follows: 
{ }( ) { }( ) { }( ) { }( ) { }( )( ) { }( ) { }( )( )BUvBURvBvBRvUvURvRvR ,,,(3
1
,
6
1),(
6
1
3
1
−+−+−+=φ  
The Shapley values for all players participating in the game are presented in the table 3. The 
relative size of payoff (in percent) indicates the strength of the player’s position and is 
referred to as the player’s power index.  
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Table 3: Relative Shapley Value [%] 
 
The results can be interpreted as follows. Russia obtains half of the total profit, while 
Ukraine and Belarus share the other half. The unequal shares of Ukraine and Belarus, 35.7% 
and 14.3% respectively, reflect the differences in capacities at South and Yamal 1.  
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5. Results 
5.1 The Power Structure in the Supply Chain for Russian 
Gas 
The aim of the example given above, which was based on the assumption that the profits 
available to the various possible coalitions of the game are proportional to the installed 
transmission capacities, was to give a simple presentation of how the Shapley value can be 
derived for different players participating in a game. In the following I operate with a fully 
calibrated model (described in section 3.2 “Calibration”) which captures the costs of 
alternative pipelines, demand for gas and production and transportation costs. The profit 
which a particular coalition can achieve, i.e. the value of a coalition K, is calculated 
according to: 
( ) ( ) ( ) l
Ll
l xTxCxxpKv
K
∑
∈
−−= 0  
where KL denotes the pipeline options available to coalition K, lx  is the quantity delivered 
through link l, x is total supply, lT  stands for link specific transportation cost per unit of gas, 
p is inverse demand for Russian gas, and 0C denotes production cost. 
In the following I use the Shapley value approach to calculate the relative power of the 
different players along the supply chain for Russian gas for various assumptions on the 
scope of the game.  
“Status Quo” Game 
The “status quo” game represents the short-sighted scenario, where the existing gas network 
consisting of South and Yamal 1, 70 bcm/a and 28 bcm/a respectively, cannot be changed. 
Furthermore, there would be no commercial interest to increase capacity as, given my 
assumptions on demand and supply, the existing capacities are close to the optimal (see 
section 3.2 “Calibration”). Consequently, the power of a player is determined by his control 
over installed pipelines. 
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Table 4: Relative Shapley value for the “Status Quo” Game 
 
In this situation, Russia completely depends on Belarus and Ukraine for transit. If the only 
possible transport route were through Ukraine, then Russia and Ukraine would share the 
profits 50%-50%. However, with the construction of Yamal 1, Belarus emerged as a 
competitor to Ukraine. The two countries compete for transit service, but the competition 
remains limited as the countries’ capacities are restricted. Ukraine suffers a lot from the 
competing route, as it loses 36.4% of the profit it would receive as being the only transit 
country. Russia obtains 57%, which is just 7 points more than the 50% that it would receive 
if facing a monopolistic transit country. The unequal shares of Ukraine and Belarus, 31.8% 
and 11.1% respectively, reflect the differences in capacities at South and Yamal 1.  
“All Options” Game 
However, the picture changes significantly when I take into account the various possibilities 
to modify the pipeline network – the situation which reflects the far-sighted scenario of the 
game. On its own, Russia would choose Nord Stream, the only option for which it does not 
need partners. Russia and Ukraine together forgo investment in Nord Stream and rather 
choose to upgrade the existing system South, which is the cheapest option for creating new 
capacities. This may seem surprising as one would expect the coalition to install the large 
capacities of Nord Stream in order to increase sales. However, it should be noted that given 
my assumptions on demand and supply, the profit maximizing quantity of the coalition is 
102 bcm/a. Consequently, the costly investment in the Nord Stream pipeline would be 
considered excessive, as the coalition will not be able to sell almost a half of the additional 
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quantities. By abstaining from the project and in stead choosing to upgrade the depreciated 
system in Ukraine, the coalition avoids the high cost of Nord Stream while it obtains low 
cost capacities of 15 bcm/a at South. 
Table 5: Relative Shapley Value for the “All options” Game 
 
Given that Russia's access to the Polish section of Yamal 1 is secured, the coalition of Russia 
and Belarus would use the existing 28 bcm/a of Yamal 1 and install a capacity of 55 bcm/a at 
Nord Stream, while abstaining from investment in the second string of the Yamal pipeline. 
Even though the capacity cost of the offshore pipeline is twice as large as the cost of Yamal 
2, this investment option would provide substantial additions to the coalition’s capacities 
without strengthening Belarus’s strategic position. None of the additional investment options 
would be used by the grand coalition of all players as the existing capacities are very close to 
the profit maximizing quantity of 102 bcm/a. Hence, there would be no commercial interest 
to increase capacity. The Shapley value results of the “all options” game show that Russia 
obtains three fourths of the total profit – a 30% increase of the profit compared to the “status 
quo” game. The shares of Ukraine and Belarus are down to 21.8% and 3.2% respectively.  
It should be noted that the choice of pipeline options available to the various coalitions of the 
game depends on the profit maximizing quantity of the grand coalition. Should the demand 
for Russian gas increase, resulting in a higher optimal quantity, the coalitions may choose 
differently. In the case where the demand is high enough to justify investment in the Nord 
Stream pipeline, both the grand coalition and the coalition of Russia and Ukraine would 
choose to install the capacities of Nord Stream in order to increase sales. This will further 
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strengthen Russia’s strategic position in the game as an even larger share of the total profit 
would be allocated to the Russian supplier. 
The Strategic Value of Pipeline Options 
To assess the strategic value of each investment option, I add one option at a time to the 
benchmark case “status quo” game and evaluate the changes it gives in the power structure. 
(A more detailed analysis of each investment option can be found in the appendix.) As 
mentioned previously, upgrading the depreciated transmission system in Ukraine provides 
the cheapest way to increase transport capacity. Hence, Upgrade is commercially the most 
interesting investment option for small additions to the capacity. 
Table 6: Relative Shapley Value [%] 
 
However, it has small impact on the power structure because the existing capacities at South 
are already large. The Yamal 2 pipeline, which is the second cheapest option for creating 
new capacities, would have a substantial impact on the power structure. This investment 
option weakens Ukraine’s position in the competition for transit service, and consequently 
reduces the country’s share by more than 9 points, which is almost a third of the share in the 
“status quo” game. Nord Stream, the pipeline that would provide Russia with a direct assess 
to its customers in the West, has the strongest impact on the power structure. It raises 
Russia’s power index from 57.1% to 73.9%, while it cuts Ukraine’s and Belarus’s shares by 
11.2 and 5.6 points respectively. The strategic importance of Nord Stream explains Russia’s 
interest in the project, which from a commercial point of view makes little economic sense 
due to its high cost. 
5.2 Summary of the Results 
In this thesis I have used cooperative game theory, the Shapley value, to develop and 
calibrate a model of the power structure in the supply chain for Russian gas. The bargaining 
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power of the different players along this supply chain is derived endogenously from the 
architecture of the transmission system and its possible extensions. The power structure thus 
obtained reflects the essential economic futures, such as different cost of alternative 
pipelines, demand for gas, production costs, etc.  
In general it is difficult to make use of the Shapley value in applied research. In order to 
calculate it, one must be able to calculate the profits of each possible coalition, the number of 
which grows rapidly as the number of players increases. Furthermore, the probabilities of the 
various possible coalitions may be very different from the situation prevailing in reality. As 
already discussed in section 3.1 “Theory”, all coalitions of the same size are regarded as 
equally likely in the Shapley value approach, which may not be the case in reality. This 
raises the problem of obtaining data and making predictions for rather hypothetical situations 
– which severely limits the practical applicability of the concept. Probably there are only a 
few markets for which there is enough information available, so that it is possible to 
calculate the profits for “unreal” situations with reasonable accuracy.7  
Fortunately, the number of players in the supply chain for Russian gas is small and the 
investment options available to the various coalitions can be easily derived from the 
geography of the pipeline network. Moreover, all projects which have been considered in 
this thesis have already been proposed in one form or another – often with detailed cost 
estimates. In this sense, the Eurasian gas transmission system offers a good opportunity to 
assess the usefulness of the Shapley value in applied research.  
Taking into account three options to extend the transmission system, I obtain a picture of the 
overall distribution of profits in the supply chain. The Shapley value approach allows me to 
evaluate the strategic impact of each single investment option on the power structure as well 
as it helps to understand the historical development of the gas network. The post Soviet 
development of the transmission system reflects to a large degree Russia’s attempts to 
strengthen its strategic position with regard to the transit countries – in particular Ukraine. In 
the case of pipelines, most of the investment in transport infrastructure is sunk and major 
players are independent nations, which leads to a substantial risk of opportunistic 
recontracting. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has engaged in several 
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 Hubert, Franz and Svetlana Ikonnikova (February 2003): Strategic Investment and Bargaining Power in Supply Chains: A 
Shapley Value Analysis of the Eurasian Gas Market. First draft.  
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gas disputes with Russia, leveraging its strategic positions in the supply chain in order to 
gain concessions for its own gas imports. Although the renovation and upgrading of the old 
transmission system in Ukraine would provide a cheap way to increase capacity, the 
investment has not been undertaken in the past, as the country is considered to be a player 
who cannot credibly commit to adhere to long–term agreements. The Yamal 1 pipeline was 
built with the purpose of reducing Ukraine’s powerful position in the supply chain. The 
option to extend the Yamal pipeline, which is also commercially attractive, would further 
reduce the bargaining power of Ukraine and increase the competition between the two transit 
countries. However, by far the strongest impact on the bargaining power is exerted by Nord 
Stream. Although this project cannot compete commercially with the other options to 
increase transmission capacity, it strengthens Russia’s position dramatically by allowing for 
lower capacity utilisation rates of the existing transit routes. 
Plans for a direct offshore connection through the Baltic Sea do not only reflect Russia’s 
desire to strengthen its strategic position vis-à-vis transit countries, but also serve as an 
answer to the increased energy needs of the European Union. Nord Stream would be an 
important contribution to security of supply as it would meet a quarter of additional import 
needs of Europe. However, concerned with the climate protection, the European Union has 
adopted several policies aimed at improvement of efficiency in energy production and use, 
and at development of renewable energy markets, which would have further consequences 
for energy markets. According to PROGRESS 2008, the avoided natural gas consumption 
due to new renewable energy capacities installed between 2005 and 2020 would equal 20% 
of total EU gas consumption in 2020. A growing role of renewable energy sources at the 
European energy market may lead to a lower demand for Russian gas in the future, which 
suggests that the Nord Stream pipeline may actually be superfluous, and that existing 
capacities could in fact be sufficient to meet the future demand.  
On the supply side, the turmoil surrounding Russia’s relations with the transit countries does 
not necessarily need to be the largest threat to stable Russian gas deliveries to Europe, as 
there are other critical issues within the Russian gas industry that need to be dealt with. 
There are several reasons for why Russia may not be the stable and dominant provider of gas 
that Europe for a long time has been accustomed to. In the next section of the thesis, I look 
more deeply into various factors that have potential to affect future supply and demand for 
Russian gas, and investigate whether the construction of Nord Stream may actually be 
superfluous.  
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6. Can Nord Stream Be Superfluous? 
6.1 European Gas Demand 
6.1.1 European natural gas market 
It is difficult to generalise on natural gas use within the EU as gas production, supply and 
user infrastructure have been developed on the basis of individual countries’ own reserves 
and in relation to diverse national energy policies. Hence, gas use tends to vary noticeably 
between countries. Still, some broad observations can be made. Natural gas has been an 
important source of energy diversity in EU energy supply, growing from 18% of energy mix 
in 1990 to 24% in 2007. Today, natural gas remains the second most used energy source in 
the EU. Gas covers some 28% of EU industrial energy needs, and more then one third of 
residential and commercial needs, being especially important in space heating. 
FIGURE 2 
 
Source: Europe’s Energy Position: Markets and Supply (2009) 
EU natural gas production peaked in 1996, plateauing until around 2004, and has since been 
falling in line with its mature status, indicating that European gas fields are becoming 
depleted. According to IEA (2008), EU production has dropped by around 12% during the 
period 2005-2007, and is projected to fall further to the point where 2020 output is expected 
to be about 56% of 2004 production.  
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Gas imports have been an important feature of Europe’s gas supply for some decades. By 
2007, the EU imported 60.3% of gas consumption. The three main suppliers of natural gas to 
the EU in 2007 were Russia (41% of imports), Norway (27%) and Algeria (17%). Russia is 
by far the most important exporting country to the EU, while Europe is the most important 
destination for Russia’s energy exports.  
Gas is projected to play a growing role in meeting EU energy needs and in relationship with 
the electricity sector. Gas has become the preferred choice for new power plant investment 
in most EU countries. National policies in some European countries are strong drivers for 
this development, such as the politically determined early phase-out of nuclear power in 
Germany, Belgium, Spain and Sweden. Gas is also favoured over coal and oil for its lower 
emissions, especially of carbon dioxide. 
Gas-fired power generation has many advantages that make it attractive to investors. Gas-
fired plants have lower capital costs and shorter construction time than most other 
technologies, at the same time as they are very efficient at converting primary energy into 
electricity. Moreover, the operating flexibility of these plants makes them the preferred 
choice to meet Europe’s increasingly peaky and seasonal power demand. IEA (2008) expects 
EU gas imports to rise further, from 63% of supply in 2010 to 77% in 2020.  
The share of Russian hydrocarbons on the EU market is projected to remain high in the 
future, considering not only the geographical proximity of Russia and the EU but also the 
large Russian reserves of hydrocarbons and falling domestic production from the EU’s North 
Sea oil and gas fields.  
6.1.2 Climate Protection - The Policies of the European Union 
Future development of gas demand in Europe relies heavily on growing awareness of 
environmental concerns and related regulations. As the latest scientific evidence suggests, 
the pace of climate change resulting from man-made emissions of greenhouse gases — the 
bulk of which come from burning fossil fuels — is faster than predicted. The urgent need for 
a veritable energy revolution, involving a wholesale global shift to low-carbon technologies, 
is now widely recognised. Governments worldwide are concerned with finding a way of 
supplying the world’s growing energy needs in a way that does not irreparably harm the 
environment. 
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Because climate protection is one of the focal points of the EU’s policies, a comprehensive 
policy package was agreed on in 2007, leading to proposals for new EU legislation and 
measures from the European Commission. These include binding targets to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 20% compared to 1990 levels, increase the share of renewable 
energy in the gross final energy consumption to 20% and non-binding target to reduce 
energy consumption by 20%, all by 2020. Moreover, in December 2008 EU leaders agreed a 
new directive which breaks the overall 20% renewable energy sources (RES) target down 
into individual binding Member States targets. Member States will have now to consider the 
best option to attract investment and support the development of RES in a cost efficient way, 
taking into account the differences between each sector.  
In order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective manner, the EU Countries 
have agreed to set up an internal market enabling companies to trade carbon dioxide 
pollution permits. In January 2005, The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS) commenced operation as the largest multi-country, multi-sector greenhouse gas 
emission trading system in the world. Under this scheme, some 10,000 energy intensive 
plants across the EU are required to buy and sell permits to release carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere. Market based instruments such as the EU ETS will be a key tool to ensure that 
Europe and other countries reach their targets at least cost. Carbon penalties under the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme help gas to compete against more carbon-intensive coal in the 
power sector and heavy industry, as switching from coal-fired to gas-fired power generation 
is often one of the cheapest options to reduce CO2 emissions in the near term.  
The EU’s ultimate objective is to limit global average temperature increase to less than 2°C 
compared to pre-industrial levels. This will limit the impacts of climate change and the 
likelihood of massive and irreversible disruptions of the global ecosystem. According to the 
IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, this will require atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gas emissions to remain well below 550ppm (parts per million of CO2 
equivalent). A stabilisation of long-term concentrations at 450 ppm CO2-eq corresponds to a 
50% chance of restricting the increase in global average temperature to around 2°C.   
Stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentration at 450 ppm CO2-eq is also assessed in World 
Energy Outlook 2008 under the name “the 450 Policy Scenario”. In this scenario global 
energy-related CO2 emissions are expected to peak in 2020 and then begin a sharp, sustained 
decline. By 2030 global energy-related CO2 emissions are assumed to fall by 8% relative to 
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2006. This would require much stronger and broader policy action from 2020 onwards, 
inducing quicker development and deployment of low-carbon technologies. 
6.1.3 Renewable Energy Sources 
Increasing concerns over energy security and climate change, coupled with higher fossil-fuel 
prices, declining investment costs and government support, are expected to encourage the 
development of renewable energy for electricity production in many parts of the world. IEA 
(2008) projects electricity from renewable energy sources to overtake gas as the world’s 
second-largest source of electricity behind coal before 2015, rising from 18% in 2006 to 
23% in 2030. In the EU-27, RES consumption has almost doubled since 1990. RES remain 
the fifth source of EU gross inland consumption (energy mix) in 2007 with a share of 7.8%. 
A fast-growing market for renewable energy is to be expected in Europe given the large gap 
between actual RES deployment and the 20% target. 
6.1.4 Summary of the Demand Side 
The share of Russian gas on the EU market is projected to remain high in the future, 
considering not only the geographical proximity of Russia and the EU but also the large 
Russian reserves of hydrocarbons and falling domestic production in the EU.   
However, over the last decade, renewable sources of energy have received a significant 
boost as a result of policy and technology progress. Given the large gap between actual RES 
deployment and the 20 % target, a fast-growing European market for renewable energy is to 
be expected. The long-term fundamentals for RES development, such as climate change, are 
strong and should attract investment. As already experienced, the large roll-out of RES in 
energy infrastructure in the EU has not been left to the market alone. The binding EU-wide 
target to source 20% of EU energy needs from renewables by 2020, has created certainty for 
investors in renewable energy technologies.  
Deploying RES infrastructure and developing RES markets at a larger scale will have further 
consequences for energy markets and in particular for electricity. The increased RES 
deployment in the 20% target case will reduce fossil fuel demand and thus is an important 
element in improving the security of energy supply in Europe. According to PROGRESS 
2008, the avoided natural gas consumption due to new RES capacities installed between 
2005 and 2020 would equal 20% of total EU gas consumption in 2020 or 24% of default gas 
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import needs. Consequently, the future development of gas demand in Europe relies heavily 
on the degree to which the EU succeeds in achieving the 20% target.  
6.2 Supply of Russian Gas 
6.2.1 The Production Capacity of Gazprom 
Russia’s resources are unquestionably large enough to support continuing long-term growth 
in production. Russia is the world’s largest natural gas producer and exporter; one-quarter of 
the global gas reserves (48 tcm) are located in the country, and there are undoubtedly more 
to be discovered. However, there are doubts about the cost of developing those resources and 
the speed with which Gazprom and independent companies can proceed. The Russian gas 
industry is at a cross-roads as production shifts from the super-giant fields upon which 
Gazprom has almost exclusively depended for the last four decades to fields located in new, 
more difficult-to-develop regions which need new transportation infrastructure. Russia’s 
three super-giant fields in western Siberia, Medvezhye, Urengoy and Yamburg, have all 
reached their decline phase of production. Output from these fields, which currently accounts 
for over 60% of Gazprom’s production, is expected to fall in coming years. However, there 
are considerable doubts about the rate of production decline and the extent to which 
judicious investment could reduce it. The giant Shtokman gas field in the Barents Sea has 
vast gas deposits. Difficult mining conditions require huge upfront investments; hence the 
projected start-up from this field has been delayed. 
Gazprom plans to offset partially these production declines in the next few years by raising 
output from a fourth super-giant gas field, Zapolyarnoye. Gazprom is also planning to 
develop other deposits, mainly in western Siberia, over the next decade. It plans to prioritise 
the development of new, smaller associated satellite fields in the Nadym-Pur-Taz region in 
order to be able to make use of existing pipelines and compensate for inevitable production 
decline of the three main fields.  
In order to compensate for the decline in the existing gas fields and avoid scarcity of 
production, massive investments in the Russian gas industry are needed. The cost of Russian 
gas will inevitably increase as production from old low cost fields declines and new, more 
expensive fields have to be developed.  
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6.2.2 Independent Producers 
Gazprom dominates the Russian gas sector, accounting for over 60% of Russian reserves 
(almost 30 tcm) and almost 85% of Russian production. Gazprom owns the Russian gas 
transmission system and has a legal monopoly on gas exports. Being a state controlled 
company, Gazprom has obligations to meet the domestic demand at any price by either using 
its own production or allowing alternative supplies from independent producers to fill the 
potential gap.  
The main non-market feature of the Russian economy inherited from the Soviet era is the 
low domestic gas prices. Domestic gas prices are regulated by the Russian government and 
are significantly lower than the prices Gazprom obtains from its sales to Western Europe, 
even after netting back exports and customs duties and transportation costs. The European 
gas market is the most profitable market for Gazprom despite the additional costs such as 
transit payments to Ukraine and Belarus. Hence, Gazprom would prefer to earn more on 
additional sales to export markets if other suppliers could cover more of the domestic 
market.  
Besides Gazprom there is a small competitive fringe of gas suppliers represented by 
independent gas producers and major Russian oil companies that serve the domestic market, 
while Gazprom is the sole exporter of Russian gas. Oil companies and independent gas 
producers each account for another 20% of Russian gas reserves and produce the balance of 
total production. Formally, the price of independent gas producers is not regulated; hence 
they are free to charge their own price. However, the price at which the independent 
producers sell their gas is close to the regulated one. The independents have little leverage 
over price as their production is principally constrained by the permission of Gazprom to 
access the transmission pipelines connecting independent producers to the domestic market. 
Although Gazprom is legally obliged to offer the spare transportation capacity to third 
parties, few agreements have been reached, mainly because charges are considered 
prohibitive. Faced with a monopsony buyer, independents have no choice but sell their gas 
directly to Gazprom at low prices or flare it. 
Although the non-Gazprom producers account for only 14% of total production, they have 
the potential to play an increasing role in the Russian natural gas industry as they control a 
significant share of Russia’s natural gas reserves. But even though the production potential 
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of independent producers is high and the investment shortage is not an obstacle, independent 
producers are reluctant to initiate new projects that will increase their production capacity as 
long as Gazprom controls the market access through its pipeline ownership.  
If Gazprom opens up for competition and grant the independent producers guaranteed access 
to markets, it would imply larger volumes of cheap (associated) gas available to the domestic 
market. It would also enhance Russian gas supply through improved pipelines operations, 
reducing leakage, and reduced flaring. Consequently, with independent producers covering a 
larger share of the domestic market, Gazprom would be able to reallocate more of its 
supplies towards Europe. 
6.2.3 Investment and the Domestic Price Reform 
As described earlier, Russia’s gas production in the future will increasingly depend on fields 
in much more difficult-to-develop and environmentally sensitive regions. Massive 
investments in Russian natural gas industry are needed to compensate for the decline of the 
West Siberian giants, to develop new fields and to build pipelines to connect them to the 
domestic network and export systems.  
Gazprom lacks the financial ability to compensate for the production decline and to upgrade 
the aging transportation network. A critical uncertainty for the financial health of the gas 
industry and its capacity to finance capital spending is the governmental regulation of 
domestic gas prices, which remain well below full cost. A gradual price increase is one of 
the main elements in the Russian energy strategy, as it is believed to be essential to provide 
the necessary investments into the Russian gas industry. Gas prices are planned to rise 
gradually to Western European levels, so that domestic prices will be at “parity” with export 
prices less transportation and excise duty. At present, it seems likely that this strategy will be 
revised so parity is achieved not earlier than 2015.  
The abolition of domestic price regulation would provide better incentives for domestic 
production and sales, reduced flaring and losses in pipelines. It will enable Gazprom to make 
profits on the Russian market that could be invested in new facilities. The Russian domestic 
gas market reforms may also have a substantial effect on the total amount of Russian gas 
sold in the European market, as domestic prices affect Russian gas demand and, therefore, 
the amount of gas that will be available for export. At higher domestic price levels, the 
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Russian demand response is negative, creating additional volumes for export markets. This is 
often described as the Russian natural gas bubble.  
Both domestic price reforms and sufficient independent gas supplies seem to be essential for 
the Russian gas industry in the future. A failure to implement much-needed market reforms, 
including raising domestic prices to full-cost levels and giving independent producers access 
to Gazprom’ s monopoly national transmission system, could impede the financing of new 
projects and opportunities for the independents to develop their own reserves. 
6.2.4 The Role of Long-Term Contracts for the Allocation of 
Gazprom Supplies 
As mentioned previously, in the domestic market Gazprom has obligations to meet the 
demand at any price determined by the government or allow alternative sources of supply to 
fill the gap if necessary. Gazprom allocates its production of natural gas between the Russian 
domestic market at an exogenously regulated price, and the European export market, mostly 
determined by so called take-or-pay contracts. Historically, the Eurasian transmission system 
was developed under long-term agreements, typically ranging from 15 to 25 years, which 
regulated prices and quantities to ensure the efficient usage of the capacities and steady 
revenues. In these take-or-pay contracts, the buyer agrees to receive a certain volume of gas 
per year or, alternatively, to pay for the portion of gas he does not want to receive. Gas 
delivered at the long-term contract is priced according to a price formula that links the 
current gas price to the price of relevant energy substitutes, such as oil products. Gas prices 
are thus set at such a level that the relation between gas prices and oil product prices does not 
give gas users any incentive to switch to the alternative fuel. With the so-called netback 
market value concept, the price for the gas producers is derived from the end user prices for 
the cheapest alternative fuel. Consequently, fluctuations in oil prices are passed on to the 
producers of the gas. These long-term contracts include the possibility of price renegotiation 
to adjust to the oil price every three to six months.  
Whereas LTCs remain important, their share and average contract duration will probably be 
gradually reduced. The EU aims to open up the natural gas market for more competition in 
all parts of the supply chain with the purpose of bringing gas prices down through increased 
competition. Moves to liberalise gas market in Western Europe are expected to lead to 
increased gas-to-gas competition and could ultimately exert downward pressure on Russian 
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export prices. Liberalisation is also likely to affect the terms and conditions of future long-
term contracts. European merchant gas companies would seek contracts of shorter duration 
and more flexible pricing terms in response to the increased market risks they face. It is 
believed that the ongoing liberalization of the internal European gas market will gradually 
reduce the role of the long-term contracts in favour of more flexible short-term contracts and 
spot trade.  
A study made by Sagen & Tsygankova (2007) investigates whether a fully competitive 
European gas market may provide incentives for Gazprom to change its export behaviour. 
Their findings suggest that the level of gas exports tied to LTCs may prove to be highly 
significant for Gazprom’s allocation of gas sales in the future. A liberalised European export 
market, largely determined by more flexible short-term contracts and spot sales, seems to 
favour Gazprom in terms of possibilities to exercise market power in the European market. 
The rationale behind this finding is that export prices are more sensitive to additional exports 
when the share of flexible short-term markets is large. The results of the study show that in 
an oligopoly market place market players (in this case Gazprom) have incentives to hold 
back exports to maintain higher prices. As Gazprom faces increasing marginal costs for 
higher production levels, Sagen & Tsygankova (2007) find that Gazprom would hold back 
its total production to achieve optimal sales in both domestic and export markets. In the 
situation where domestic prices are not large enough to cover the costs, increased exports 
will lead to lower export prices than what is optimal for Gazprom. Hence, Gazprom would 
adjust its export volume to achieve optimal prices and revenues in its export market, and 
regulate independent supplies to achieve optimal revenues in the domestic market. The 
larger the sensitivity of export prices, resulting from a larger spot market, the larger are the 
incentives and willingness to use accessible market power to influence prices in that 
particular market. Sagen and Tsygankova (2007) conclude that only if domestic prices 
approach the netback levels of European market prices minus the cost of transport, overall 
export volumes move towards the peak export levels observed in a traditional LTC market 
structure. Otherwise Europe may actually have less imports of Russian gas.  
6.2.5 Summary of the Supply Side 
The sufficiency of reserves in Russia is not an issue. However, coupled with stagnating 
production in existing fields, fast-growing domestic consumption, and increased export 
commitments, it leads to very uncertain projections for the near future. Russian gas 
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production is increasingly dominated by production from new, more difficult-to-develop 
regions requiring substantial investments in the Russian natural gas industry. In particular, 
the ability of Gazprom and other gas suppliers to finance new supply projects and their 
incentives to do so are highly dependent on the prices that they are able to achieve on both 
domestic and export markets. A combination of low Russian gas prices and low production 
capacity may be disastrous for the future flow of Russian gas. If Gazprom continues to be 
the domestic gas provider of last resort, scarce production capacities of both Gazprom and 
independent producers will restrict export volumes if the domestic market is given political 
priorities. Increased domestic gas prices from the present level will create improved export 
possibilities resulting from lower Russian gas demand and increased gas supplies from 
independent producers. Thus, for the European Union it can be particularly important that 
Russia is able to further increase domestic prices toward international market levels and 
thereby release large gas volumes for exports.  
Furthermore, if Gazprom opens up for competition and gives independent producers 
guaranteed access to the national transmission system, it would encourage development and 
production from Russia’s vast gas reserves and of associated gas.  
Finally, liberalisation of the European gas market, enforced by the emergence of new 
contract mechanisms such as spot market, short-term or non-dedicated contracts, is likely to 
affect the terms and conditions of future long-terms contracts. If volumes of long-term 
contract are reduced, it might be optimal for Gazprom to reduce its exports in favour of 
domestic gas sales in order to achieve a balance between marginal revenues in both domestic 
and export markets. Thus, a liberalized European gas market may provide even less Russian 
exports in the future. 
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7. Conclusions 
The future of Russian gas exports to Europe is subject to a wide range of uncertainties, 
notably about underlying demand, price and cost factors. Due to low regulated domestic gas 
prices and lack of investment in new gas fields and infrastructure, Russia might soon have 
problems balancing production, rising domestic demand and growing export commitments. 
Should there be a scarcity of gas, building Nord Stream might not be justified, as the 
capacities of existing pipelines should suffice to meet the European demand.  
Future development of gas demand in Europe relies heavily on growing awareness of 
climate change and increased reliance on non-fossil fuels. The policies of the European 
Union, aimed at reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and increase of the share of 
renewable energy in the energy mix, provide incentives for investment in emission reduction 
technologies and low carbon alternatives. The increased deployment of the renewable energy 
sources will lead to a decline of fossil fuel demand in Europe. However, switching, from 
coal-fired to gas-fired power generation is often one of the cheapest options to reduce CO2 
emissions in the near term, depending on gas and coal prices. Therefore, gas-fired power is 
likely to play an important role in the targets of the European Union, providing a continued 
strong driver for gas-fired power generation in Europe. All these factors should be 
considered carefully when predicting future European demand for Russian gas.  
In the case of lower demand, upgrading the capacity at South by 15 bcm/a could be justified, 
but expanding Yamal would not be warranted, whereas building the Nord Stream pipeline 
would be considered as a major overinvestment from a commercial point of view. However, 
using the Shapley value approach I found out that investment in the Nord Stream pipeline 
significantly increases Russia’s bargaining power. Therefore, Nord Stream should be 
considered not only from a commercial point of view, but also as a strategic move. By 
installing large capacity in Nord Stream, Russia creates a countervailing power to Ukraine 
and Belarus. This offshore pipeline would allow Russia to use the capacities at South and 
Yamal to a lesser extent, a threat that is strong enough for Ukraine and Belarus not to exploit 
their bargaining positions to the full.  
In the high demand case, all three investment options might be justified. Even though 
expanding the facilities in Ukraine and Belarus would strengthen these countries in ex-post 
negotiations, the investment in the Nord Stream pipeline would contribute to diversification 
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of the supply routes and provide Russia with a countervailing power which will weaken the 
transit countries’ strategic position in the supply chain. 
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APPENDIX A: Transportation Cost 
The total cost of transport gas can be decomposed into capacity cost c and operating cost, the 
latter consisting of management and maintenance cost m and energy cost g. In order to 
obtain a realistic picture of the differences in transportation costs, these items are estimated 
for every possible link separately. 
In the case of pipeline technology, the cost of providing transport capacity is roughly 
proportional to distance and the same applies to maintenance. However, energy cost, which 
to a large degree consists of the value of gas that is consumed by compressors, is more 
difficult to calculate because the price of gas increases along the way. As the fraction of gas 
used over a given distance is approximately constant, the marginal transportation cost of 
supplying gas through a particular link l can be calculated according to:8 
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where ly  denotes the length of the pipeline, lg is the fraction of the gas per distance which is 
needed for pressurizing, and 0MC is the marginal cost of production. The latter affects 
transportation cost because it determines the value of compressor gas. Note that the 
parameters lm , lc  and lg  refer to a particular link, while x refers to the aggregate quantity. 
Given the marginal cost of production function estimated earlier, 
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In the following I explain in detail how the different components of the transportation cost 
formula are obtained. 
                                               
8
 Hubert, Franz and Svetlana Ikonnikova (December 2007), p.34. The marginal cost of supplying gas through a particular 
link i is obtained according to: ( ) ( ) ( )( ) iiiygygi gmceexmcyxmc iiii /1, 0 +−+= . By deducting the initial value 
of 0mc , the marginal cost of transportation is obtained.  
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Capacity Cost 
For existing pipelines, South and Yamal 1, capacity cost is sunk and thus can be ignored in 
the analysis. Regarding new projects, such as Nord Stream and Yamal 2, there are 
considerable variations in published cost estimates. Therefore, I complement published 
information with figures obtained from Hubert & Ikonnikova (2007) who estimate the cost 
of establishing the capacity for a complete link from a major node in the Russian system to 
the border of Western Europe. Cost of pipes, compressors and track preparations are 
estimated to reflect the situation in 2000.   
For new pipelines, the capacity cost is roughly proportional to distance, however, there are 
economies of scale gained from laying pipelines along the same track. Some costs of 
preparing the ground, building supply roads, etc. can be avoided by using established tracks. 
Parallel pipelines also allow for sharing of compressor power and to economize on backup 
facilities. Finally, an isolated new pipeline has to cross the whole distance before supplying 
the first gas, while capacity along existing tracks can be increased gradually and therefore 
more timely adjusted to the growth of demand. As new pipelines need about three years for 
completion, 15% of investment cost for interest during construction is added in these cases.  
The figures in the third column of table 7 show that the capacity costs vary considerably 
between the different investment options. For South and Yamal 1 capacity cost is sunk, the 
Upgrade project has low capacity cost as it can make use of the existing infrastructure, while 
Nord Stream has the highest capacity cost. As all figures are expressed on annual basis, I 
calculate the annualized cost of capacity for each link l as follows: 
T
l
l
r
rIC
−+−
⋅
= )1(1  
where lI  is the project specific investment cost per capacity, T = 25 denotes the expected 
lifetime of the facilities and r = 15% is assumed interest rate for investment in the gas 
industry.  
Finally, I calculate the annualized capacity cost per 100km for each link l by dividing the 
annualized capital cost of the link l by the total length of the link, lll yCc /= . The results are 
presented in the fourth column of table 7. 
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Table 7: Transport Links for Russian Gas 
 
Operating Cost 
The cost of management and maintenance, im , is assumed to be proportional to distance and 
quantity of gas, and equal to km100/tcm/$1.0m l =  for all pipelines, except the offshore 
pipeline Nord Stream, for which the figure is doubled due to the pipeline’s large offshore 
section. To keep the gas moving, a certain fraction g of it is used to power compressor 
stations. Energy cost is assumed to be km100/%25.0g =  for all pipelines, except for South 
and Nord Stream. As the compressors at South are old and inefficient and because Nord 
Stream needs much higher pressure for its offshore section, both links have %5.0g = . 
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APPENDIX B: The Strategic Value of Pipeline 
Options 
Calculations behind the Shapley value results presented in section 5. “Results” can be found 
in this appendix. I also explain the choice of capacities for each coalition.   
Upgrade 
Table 8: Relative Shapley value - Upgrade 
 
In this game, the option to upgrade the existing system South is available to coalitions which 
include Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine together choose to invest in Upgrade as it will bring 
the coalition’s capacities closer to the optimal quantity of 102 bcm/a. The grand coalition of 
all players will forgo investment in Upgrade, as the existing capacities of the coalition are 
already close to the optimal. 
Yamal 2 
The option to build the second string of the Yamal pipeline is available to coalitions which 
include Belarus. The coalition of Russia and Belarus would use the existing 28 bcm/a of 
Yamal 1 and install a capacity of 28 bcm/a at Yamal 2 in order to increase sales. The grand 
coalition will abstain from investment in Yamal 2 as the existing capacities are sufficient to 
maximize the coalition’s profits. 
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Table 9: Relative Shapley value - Yamal 2 
 
Nord Stream 
Table 10: Relative Shapley value - Nord Stream 
 
The option to invest in the offshore Nord Stream pipeline is available to coalitions which 
include Russia. On its own, Russia would choose Nord Stream, the only option for which it 
does not need partners, and install a capacity of 55 bcm/a. Russia and Ukraine together 
would avoid the high cost of Nord Stream, the capacity of which would be considered 
excessive given my assumptions on demand and supply. The coalition of Belarus and 
Russia, would use the existing 28 bcm/a of Yamal 1 and invest in Nord Stream, thereby 
obtaining a total capacity of 83 bcm/a. The grand coalition of all players will forgo 
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investment in Nord Stream as the existing capacities suffice to achieve the profit maximizing 
quantity. 
